Traction engines and tractors were used in small numbers during the South African war; a fleet of light motor vans was of considerable service to the Italians during their campaign in Tripoli, and a fair number of motors, noteworthy for their variety rather than their high quality, did service in the wars limited to the Balkan States. Nevertheless, it was not until the Great War broke out that it was demonstrated once and for all that the motor is a necessary adjunct to the maintenance of modern armies in the field, and consequently that a strong national motor industry is absolutely essential to any country that would stand prepared to defend its position as a Power of consequence.
All the advantages possessed by motors as against horsed transport for military purposes are directly or indirectly connected with the qualities of comparatively high speed and great endurance. So long as the supplies of food and ammunition had to be brought up from the railways by horsed transport, the mobility of an army in the field was limited by the necessity of operating within a workable radius of railhead. Moreover, the extensive use of horsed vehicles led to a terrible amount of congestion along the lines of communication. In the event of a successful offensive justifying an advance, the possibility of making full use of an initial success was limited by the difficulty of bringing up further supplies of food and ammunition at a sufficient rate in support of the advancing troops. On the other hand, when for any reason a retreat became necessary, the occupation of the principal lines of communication by cumbrous and slow-moving vehicles greatly increased the danger of such a manoeuvre, and not infrequently turned what would otherwise have been only a temporary set-back into a serious defeat. When horsed transport was used, the work of supplying troops at any distance from the railhead involved a very complex organisation. A convoy or echelon of vehicles took up the load at railhead and transported it over a mileage limited by the endurance of horseflesh. At some point, say, ten to twelve miles forward, the first echelon transferred its load to the second echelon, which carried it on for a similar distance. Thus, bit by bit, the supplies were brought forward to points near the front, from which they were distributed in detail to the troops. Clearly, under this system, several days might elapse between the time when food arrived at railhead and the time when it could be distributed among the men. When an army was advancing, it was difficult to arrange for the transport to bring supplies forward at an appreciably greater speed than that averaged by the troops themselves. The evacuation of the wounded presented similar problems, and slow transport led to much avoidable loss of life.
When motor transport is used, the journey from railhead to the distributing points adjacent to the front, or from the field hospital or the dressing station to the base hospital or the railway, is made in a single run. The speed of a motor convoy is such that, even if the troops are advancing throughout the day, the arrival of the supplies occurs very little later than if the army were stationary. Moreover, the extra carrying power and speed of mechanical transport makes it possible for one motor lorry to do as much work as four or five horsed vehicles of similar capacity. Thus, the congestion of the lines of communication is immensely reduced, and this again reacts on the speed which can be maintained. Similarly, during a retreat, motor vehicles have no difficulty in moving at such a rate as to impose no serious obstacles to the passage of the troops themselves.
A Humber Car with Ambulance Trailer
It would be no exaggeration to say that the nature of modern warfare follows largely as a result of the use of motor vehicles. These make it possible to hold positions remote from railway communications in face of tremendous concentration of artillery fire, because motors can be used to replace the railways themselves, and to bring up ammunition in sufficient quantities to establish a balance. An extraordinary example of this character occurred during the earlier stages of the battle of Verdun. The French troops found themselves subjected to a terrible onslaught backed by an enormous concentration of artillery. They had to hold positions at a long distance from railway communications. The emergency was met by the establishment of an endless chain of motor lorries between railhead and the front. The vehicles forming the links of this chain moved at a slow but steady speed. Loading went on perpetually at railhead, and unloading perpetually at the forward end of the chain. The scheme worked like a bucket-dredger, in which buckets in a continuous string continually fill and empty themselves when in determined positions.
In many other spheres than that of transport and supply motors are almost, if not quite, equally essential under the conditions of modern war. High speed cars are a necessary adjunct at headquarters for the conveyance of staff officers. Motor bicycles afford an unequalled means of travel for despatch riders. Motor omnibuses, and motor vehicles generally, enable troops to be very rapidly brought forward and concentrated at any threatened point, or at any point from which the enemy can be threatened. Thus, one of the important preliminaries to the Battle of the Marne was the rapid conveyance of a French army by motor car and motor cab around Paris. This movement, the first of its kind on a grand scale, enabled the flank of the advancing German armies to be turned, and was largely instrumental in the decisive results of the battle which saved France and the Allied cause.
It will be easily realised that the great military utility of motor vehicles, and the consequent continuous demand for the existence of large numbers of machines of types suitable for this class of work, have certain definite influences upon the motor manufacturing industry. First, there is the tendency to encourage standardisation. Military motors as a rule have to work in convoys, and it would be very difficult for a convoy to operate with its units at short intervals if the engine powers and gear ratios of the vehicles varied materially. We want, then, to arrive at some suitable standard as regards power and gears, or, in other words, the Government requiring military vehicles must endeavour to influence manufacturers towards standardisation. Again, it is obviously advisable that the control levers and pedals should be arranged according to some standard plan, so that a man who can drive one lorry can equally well drive another without experience. Most important of all is the question of maintaining military vehicles in the field. Dependence has to be placed largely upon travelling workshops the equipment of which is necessarily limited supported by lorries carrying stocks of spare parts. If all our vehicles are of one pattern, then the number of spare parts that has to be carried is reduced to a minimum, and so is the number of different machines required in connection with ordinary repairs. Thus, in military work there is everything to be said for considerable standardisation and nothing to be said against it. That standardisation is possible as regards essentials, without strangling the individuality of manufacturers, has been proved in practice, particularly by the way in which the British Government scheme has panned out.
In its early stages, it seemed probable that this scheme would tend to discourage the construction of chain-driven motor lorries, but in this particular respect the original provisions of the Government specification could not be strictly adhered to when the Great War necessitated the production of very large quantities of military vehicles.
Another tendency following on the military use of motors is the construction of substantial machines suited for regular use under very bad road conditions. Vehicles primarily intended for use on smooth highways depreciate very rapidly if used on roads torn by shells and disintegrated by a constant stream of heavy traffic. High ground clearance becomes a necessity in view of the obstructions that may be encountered. A very adequate cooling system is also essential, and, in fact, in most important respects, the military vehicle is closely akin to what is often known as the Colonial model. Thus, its enforced construction in quantity encourages the great national motor industries to build not only for their own countries, but for younger lands where roads are less adequate and facilities for motor maintenance less perfect.
In itself, the demand for military vehicles does not at normal times have any very great direct bearing on the size of the aggregate production of the industry. It is not the practice of governments in time of peace to take possession of large numbers of lorries for the service of their armies. The more usual plan is to adopt a scheme of subvention or subsidy. Under such a scheme, the owners of vehicles of suitable types employed in civilianwork are paid an annual sum so long as the vehicles are submitted to periodical inspection and found to be in good serviceable condition. In return for this payment, the owner of the vehicles contracts to sell them to the Government in the event of national emergency at pre-arranged prices depending upon their first cost and age. Thus, at a moment’s notice, the Government can take over large numbers of suitable machines without being compelled perpetually to incur the cost of the purchase and maintenance of huge fleets.
Subvention schemes along these lines had been in force in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria for some years before the Great War. They had not, however, sufficed to bring into existence fleets of military vehicles numerically adequate to meet all requirements. Consequently, what actually took place was a widespread process of commandeering all sorts and conditions of machines of about the right carrying capacity. These served their turn well enough during the first few months of the war, and were as rapidly as possible replaced by more standardised products turned out by works, the output of which was wholly taken over by the various governments. From first to last, Russia, having no considerable motor manufacturing industry, was severely handicapped by lack of an adequate supply of transport vehicles. All that could be done in her case was to import in quantity from every possible source.
As applied up to the present, Government subvention schemes have not had the effect of largely increasing the use of motors in time of peace. The attraction of the subsidy has been more or less balanced by the fact that the machines built to comply with the official specification were apt to be expensive as regards first cost. However, the influence of the Great War will be felt for a long time to come in this connection. Subvention type machines, or other types approved for military service, have been standardised and made the chief or sole product of numerous considerable factories. Increased production has led to decreased cost. Governments will no doubt continue to adjust the subsidies they offer to the conditions that rule. If the number of available machines is inadequate, the inducement must be made considerable. If the number is more than adequate, the inducement can be and no doubt will be comparatively trifling, since the power of commandeering on emergency always remains.
The development of motor forts or ” Tanks ” serves to indicate that from now onwards the military powers will have to take full responsibility for the development of certain motor machines, which would be of little or no use in civilian work. This can only be done either by construction in Government factories or by direct purchase. The latter method will probably be found the better. Experimental work will have to be carried on, particularly, no doubt, in connection with chaintrack machines and tractors in which the engine power is transmitted to all four wheels. While these special types are of the highest military importance, it is not to be anticipated that, numerically speaking, their existence will influence the output of the motor industry to any very great extent.
Altogether, then, the military motor, while absolutely essential, and while affording the finest of all examples of the vital importance of the motor industry, makes its influence felt not so much by increasing the total demand made upon the industry as by directing its energies into certain defined channels.
